The right to “not prohibitively expensive” judicial proceedings under the Aarhus Convention and the ECJ as an international (environmental) law court: Edwards and Pallikaropoulos. Case C-260/11, Edwards and Pallikaropoulos v. Environmental Agency , Judgment of the Court of Justice (Fourth Chamber) of 11 April 2013,EU:C:2013:221 by De Baere, G. & Nowak, J.
COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW
CONTENTS Vol. 53 No. 6 December 2016
Editorial comments: Withdrawing from the “ever closer union”? 1491-1500
Articles
M. Chamon, Institutional balance and Community method in the
implementation of EU legislation following the Lisbon Treaty 1501-1544
D. Thym, The “refugee crisis” as a challenge of legal design and
institutional legitimacy 1545-1574
J. Hojnik, The servitization of industry: EU law implications and
challenges 1575-1624
P. Torremans, Jurisdiction for cross-border intellectual property
infringement cases in Europe 1625-1646
M. Varju and M. Papp, The crisis, national economic particularism
and EU law: What can we learn from the Hungarian case? 1647-1674
Case law
A. Court of Justice
Mutual confidence is not blind trust! Fundamental rights protection
and the execution of the European arrest warrant: Aranyosi
and Ca˘lda˘raru, G. Anagnostaras 1675-1704
Equivalent treatment of Union rights under national procedural law:
Târs
´
ia, K. Sowery 1705-1726
The right to “not prohibitively expensive” judicial proceedings under
the Aarhus Convention and the ECJ as an international
(environmental) law court: Edwards and Pallikaropoulos,
G. De Baere and J. Nowak 1727-1752
B. National courts
Of institutions, democracy, constitutional self-defence and the rule of
law: The judgments of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in




The Common Market Law Review is designed to function as a medium for the understanding and
implementation of European Union Law within the Member States and elsewhere, and for the
dissemination of legal thinking on European Union Law matters. It thus aims to meet the needs of
both the academic and the practitioner. For practical reasons, English is used as the language of
communication.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or
otherwise, without written permission from the publisher.
Permission to use this content must be obtained from the copyright owner. Please apply to:
Permissions Department, Wolters Kluwer Legal & Regulatory U.S., 76 Ninth Avenue, 7th Floor,
NewYork, NY 10011–5201, USA. Website: www.wklawbusiness.com
Common Market Law Review is published bimonthly.
Subscription prices 2017 [Volume 54, 6 issues] including postage and handling:
2017 Print Subscription Price Starting at EUR 834/ USD 1180/ GBP 595.
2017 Online Subscription Price Starting at EUR 788/ USD 1119/ GBP 566.
This journal is also available online. Online and individual subscription prices are available upon
request. Please contact our sales department for further information at +31(0)172 641562 or at
sales@kluwerlaw.com.
Periodicals postage paid at Rahway, N.J. USPS no. 663–170.
U.S. Mailing Agent: Mercury Airfreight International Ltd., 365 Blair Road, Avenel, NJ 07001.
Published by Kluwer Law International B.V., P.O. Box 316, 2400 AH Alphen aan den Rijn,
The Netherlands
Printed on acid-free paper.
COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW
Subscription information
2017 Online Subscription Price Starting at EUR 788/ USD 1119/ GBP 566.
2017 Print Subscription Price Starting at EUR 834/ USD 1180/ GBP 595.
Personal subscription prices at a substantially reduced rate are available upon request. Please contact
our sales department for further information at +31 172641562 or at lrs-sales@wolterskluwer.com.
 
.
Payments can be made by bank draft, personal cheque, international money order, or UNESCO 
coupons.
Subscription orders should be sent to: All requests for further information
 and specimen copies should be addressed to:
Kluwer Law International Kluwer Law International
c/o Turpin Distribution Services Ltd P.O. Box 316
Stratton Business Park 2400 AH Alphen aan den Rijn
Pegasus Drive The Netherlands




or to any subscription agent
For Marketing Opportunities please contact lrs-marketing@wolterskluwer.com
Please visit the Common Market Law Review homepage at http://www.kluwerlawonline.com 
for up-to-date information, tables of contents and to view a FREE online sample copy.
Consent to publish in this journal entails the author’s irrevocable and exclusive authorization 
of the publisher to collect any sums or considerations for copying or reproduction payable by 
third parties (as mentioned in Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Dutch Copyright Act of 1912 and 
in the Royal Decree of 20 June 1974 (S.351) pursuant to Article 16b of the Dutch Copyright 
Act of 1912) and/or to act in or out of court in connection herewith.
Microfilm and Microfiche editions of this journal are available from University Microfilms 
International, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106, USA.
The Common Market Law Review is indexed/abstracted in Current Contents/Social & 
Behavioral Sciences; Current Legal Sociology; Data Juridica; European Access; European 
Legal Journals Index; IBZ-CD-ROM: IBZ-Online; IBZ-lnternational Bibliography of Peri-
odical literature on the Humanities and Social Sciences; Index to Foreign Legal Periodicals; 
International Political Science Abstracts; The ISI Alerting Services; Legal Journals Index; 
RAVE; Social Sciences Citation Index; Social Scisearch.
 
COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW
 
Editors: Thomas  Ackermann, Loïc Azoulai, Marise Cremona, Michael Dougan, Christophe





Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère, Paris
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Brussels
Giorgio Gaja, Florence
Walter van Gerven†, Leuven
Roger Goebel, New York





Pieter Jan Kuijper, Amsterdam
Ole Lando, Copenhagen
                                          Ulla Neergaard, Copenhagen
Miguel Poiares Maduro, Lisbon
Siofra O’Leary, Strasbourg
Sacha Prechal, Luxembourg
Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias, Madrid
Allan Rosas, Luxembourg
Eleanor Sharpston, Luxembourg
Piet Jan Slot, Amsterdam
Christiaan W.A. Timmermans, Brussels
Ernö Várnáy, Debrecen
Armin von Bogdandy, Heidelberg
Joseph H.H. Weiler, Florence
Jan A. Winter, Bloemendaal
Miroslaw Wyrzykowski, Warsaw
                         
                                  
                 
                         
  
  
                                       
                               
  




Managing Editor: Alison McDonnell
 Common Market Law Review
 Europa Instituut
 Steenschuur 25
 2311 ES Leiden
 The Netherlands tel.  + 31 71 5277549
 e-mail: a.m.mcdonnell@law.leidenuniv.nl fax: + 31 71 5277600







Submission of manuscripts 
Manuscripts should be submitted together with a covering letter to the Managing Editor. They 
must be accompanied by written assurance that the article has not been published, submitted 
or accepted elsewhere. The author will be notified of acceptance, rejection or need for revision 
within three to nine weeks. Digital submissions are welcomed. Articles should preferably be 
no longer than 28 pages (approx. 9,000 words). Annotations should be no longer than 10 pages 
(approx. 3,000 words). Details concerning submission and the review process can be found on 
the journal's website http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?pubcode=COLA
© 2016 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the United Kingdom.
The editors will consider for publication manuscripts by contributors from any country. 
Articles will be subjected to a review procedure. The author should ensure that the 
significance of the contribution will be apparent also to readers outside the specific 
expertise. Special terms and abbreviations should be clearly defined in the text or notes. 




communication. If editing should be extensive, with a consequent danger of altering the 
meaning, the manuscript will be returned to the author for approval before type is set.
The Common Market Law Review was established in 1963 in cooperation with the British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law and the Europa Instituut of the University 
of Leyden.The Common Market Law Review is designed to function as a medium for the
understanding and analysis of European Union Law, and for the dissemination of legal
thinking on all matters of European Union Law. It aims to meet the needs of both the
academic and the practitioner. For practical reasons, English is used as the language of 
communication.
The right to “not prohibitively expensive” judicial proceedings under
theAarhus Convention and the ECJ as an international
(environmental) law court: Edwards and Pallikaropoulos
Case C-260/11, Edwards and Pallikaropoulos v. Environmental Agency,
Judgment of the Court of Justice (Fourth Chamber) of 11 April 2013,
EU:C:2013:221
1. Introduction
The Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-Making andAccess to Justice in Environmental Matters (theAarhus
Convention) was adopted by the then European Community, its Member
States and 19 other States on 25 June 1998 in Aarhus, Denmark, within the
framework of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(UNECE), a regional commission set up in 1947 by the United Nations
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). It entered into force definitively on
30 October 2001, and was approved on behalf of the European Community in
February 2005.1 It is based on the premise that every person has the right to
live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being, and even
the duty, both individually and in association with others, to protect and
improve the environment for the benefit of present and future generations. To
be able to assert this right and observe this duty, the Aarhus Convention rests
on three “pillars”: citizens must have access to information, be entitled to
participate in decision-making and have access to justice in environmental
matters. These pillars depend on each other for the full implementation of the
Convention’s objectives.2
The EU implemented the first and second “pillars” of the Aarhus
Convention by way of Directive 2003/4 on public access to environmental
information3 and Directive 2003/35 providing for public participation in
1. Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 Feb. 2005 on the conclusion, on behalf of the
European Community, of the Convention on access to information public participation in
decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters, O.J. 2005, L 124/1.
2. UNECE, The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, 2nd ed. (2014), UN Doc.
ECE/CEP/72/Rev.1, p. 19.
3. Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 Jan. 2003 on
public access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC, O.J.
2003, L 41/26.
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respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the
environment,4 respectively.5 Both Directives also contain provisions on the
third pillar, in that their beneficiaries were given a right to access to justice in
order to protect the rights conferred on them by the Directives. Thus,Article 6
of Directive 2003/4 provides that Member States must ensure that any
applicant who considers that his request for information has not been dealt
with in accordance with the Directive must have access to an administrative
review procedure as well as to a review procedure before a court of law or
another independent and impartial body. Similarly, Directive 2003/35 inserted
Article 10(a) into Directive 85/337 (the EIA Directive)6 andArticle 15(a) into
Directive 96/61 (the IPPC Directive),7 providing access to a review procedure
before a court of law or another independent and impartial body for members
of the public concerned to challenge the substantive or procedural legality of
any decisions, acts or omissions subject to public participation provisions of
those Directives.
The costs involved in gaining access to justice are a crucial factor in
exercising those rights in practice. BothArticle 10(a) of the EIADirective and
Article 15(a) of the IPPC Directive provide that any such procedure “shall be
fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive”. The reference for a
preliminary ruling from the UK Supreme Court in Edwards gave the ECJ the
opportunity to clarify the notion of prohibitively expensive procedures in
relation to Aarhus Convention claims. The Court’s approach was
subsequently confirmed inCommission v.UK,8 which likewise concernedUK
4. Directive 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003
providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes
relating to the environment and amending with regard to public participation and access to
justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC, O.J. 2003, L 156/17.
5. The Aarhus Convention was further implemented in EU law by EC Regulation
1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the application of the provisions
of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies, O.J.
2006, L 264/13 (Aarhus Regulation), which applies the provisions of the Convention to EU
institutions and bodies.
6. Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain
public and private projects on the environment, O.J. 1985, L 175/40, as amended by Directive
2003/35 (cited supra note 4), codified byDirective 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 13 Dec. 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private
projects on the environment, O.J. 2012, L 26/1.
7. Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 Sept. 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention
and control, O.J. 1996, L 257/26, as amended by Directive 2003/35 (cited supra note 4), and
codified by Directive 2008/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 Jan. 2008
concerning integrated pollution prevention and control, O.J. 2008, L 24/8, later replaced by
Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Nov. 2010 on
industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control), O.J. 2010, L 334/17.
8. Case C-530/11, Commission v. UK, EU:C:2014:67.
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cost rules in Aarhus Convention cases. Edwards not only provides an
“outsider’s” perspective in the UK debate on cost rules reform, but also has
wider implications for EU Member States seeking to reform cost rules.
Furthermore, it highlights the role of the ECJ in the development of
international environmental law, and international law more generally. The
comments in this case note focus on these two key points.
2. Legal and factual background
Mr Edwards challenged the decision of the Environment Agency to approve
the operation of cement works, which included waste incineration, in Rugby
(UK), on the basis of the fact that the project had not been the subject of an
environmental impact assessment. He was granted legal aid to cover the costs
of the proceedings. The action was dismissed on the merits and Mr Edwards
brought an appeal before the Court of Appeal, where on the final day of the
hearing, he decided to withdraw the case. Ms Pallikaropoulos was
subsequently granted leave to take part as appellant in the remainder of the
proceedings. She did not satisfy the necessary requirements for entitlement to
legal aid, but the Court of Appeal agreed to cap her liability for costs at
£2,000. The appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded against her. Ms
Pallikaropoulos appealed to the House of Lords. She also requested that she
should not be required to give a guarantee in respect of foreseeable costs, to the
sum of £25,000.That request was refused. Ms Pallikaropoulos further applied
for a protective cost order (PCO) whereby her liability for costs would be
capped should her appeal not be allowed. That application too was refused.
The House of Lords affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision to dismiss the
appeal and ordered Ms Pallikaropoulos to pay the respondents’ costs of the
appeal, the amount of which, in the event of disagreement between the parties,
was to be fixed by the Clerk of the Parliaments. The respondents submitted
two bills for recoverable costs for £55,810 and £32,290.
In the course of the proceedings the jurisdiction of the House of Lords was
transferred to the newly-established UK Supreme Court. The rules of
procedure of the Supreme Court provide that every detailed assessment of
costs is carried out by two cost officers.9 Ms Pallikaropoulos asked the cost
officers to consider whether the EIA and IPPC Directives’ requirement for
any procedure within their scope to be fair, equitable, timely and not
prohibitively expensive, had been properly applied in her case. The cost
officers accepted jurisdiction to apply the Directives and reserved their final
decision as to the actual costs. The respondents appealed against the decision
9. Rule 49(1) of the UK Supreme Court Rules 2009 (SI 2009/1603).
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of the cost officers and two questions were referred to a panel of five Supreme
Court judges, respectively on the possibility for cost officers to take up
jurisdiction to limit costs through the process of a detailed costs assessment
and, in case of a positive answer, what factors had to be taken into account
whenmaking such an assessment.The panel held that the questionwhether the
procedure was prohibitively expensive was within the sole jurisdiction of the
court adjudicating on the substance of the case. The panel also took the view
that the question whether the order that Ms Pallikaropoulos pay the
respondents’ costs was contrary to those Directives had not been examined by
the House of Lords when it considered her application for a PCO. Under those
circumstances, the UK Supreme Court decided to stay the proceedings and
request guidance from the ECJ regarding the award of costs in environmental
judicial review proceedings against an unsuccessful claimant in the light of
Article 9(4) of theAarhus Convention, as implemented byArticle 10(a) of the
EIA Directive and Article 15(a) of the IPPC Directive.
3. Opinion ofAdvocate General Kokott10
The Advocate General dealt first with discretion for domestic measures. As
neither the Aarhus Convention nor the two Directives provide any specific
guidance in that regard, it is in principle for the Member States to determine
how to ensure that the judicial proceedings covered are not prohibitively
expensive within the meaning of Article 9(4) Aarhus Convention, Article
10(a)(5) EIA Directive and Article 15(a)(5) IPPC Directive.
In contrast, for example, to the concepts of “sufficient interest” and
“impairment of a right”, the provisions at issue do not contain a reference to
national law to interpret the concept of “prohibitively expensive”.The concept
should therefore be given an autonomous and uniform Union interpretation.
The Advocate General took the view that the proceedings may not be so
expensive that the costs threaten to prevent them from being conducted.
Reasonable but prohibitive costs are possible in particular in environmental
proceedings relating to large-scale projects, since these may be very
burdensome in every respect, for example with regard to the legal, scientific
and technical questions raised and the number of parties. Under Article 9(4)
Aarhus Convention, Article 10(a) EIA Directive and Article 15(a) IPPC
Directive, it is therefore in principle for the Member States to determine how
to avoid judicial proceedings not being conducted on account of their costs.
However, those measures must ensure in a sufficiently clear and binding
manner that the objectives of the Aarhus Convention are satisfied in each
10. Opinion of A.G. Kokott, EU:C:2012:645.
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individual case and, at the same time, observe the principles of effectiveness
and equivalence – the standard limits to the procedural autonomy of the
Member States under the Court’s case law – and the fundamental rights under
EU law.
Furthermore, the Advocate General explained that while Article 47 of the
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights relates to the protection of individual
rights, legal protection in environmental matters in general and in the Aarhus
Convention in particular also or exclusively serves the public interest, which
therefore duly needs to be taken into account in assessing whether costs of
proceedings are prohibitive.
Nevertheless, a person who combines extensive individual economic
interests with proceedings to enforce environmental law can, as a rule, be
expected to bear higher risks in terms of costs than a person who cannot
anticipate any economic benefit. Hence, the threshold for accepting the
existence of prohibitive costs may be higher where there are individual
economic interests.
The Advocate General also emphasized that the level of permissible costs
must be interpreted against the background of the Aarhus Convention’s
objective of ensuring “wide access to justice”. Nevertheless, the fact that,
despite the refusal of an application for a PCO, the claimant has not in fact
been deterred from bringing or continuing with the proceedings may be taken
duly into account afterwards in an order for costs if the obligation to prevent
prohibitive costs was observed in the decision on the application for a PCO.
However, the proceedings covered are not concluded until the decision in
question becomes final. As a result, prohibitive costs must be prevented at all
levels of jurisdiction.
Finally, the Advocate General took the view that it is compatible with
Article 9(4) Aarhus Convention and with the provisions of the EIA Directive
and the IPPCDirective to re-examine at each level of jurisdiction the extent to
which prohibitive costs must be prevented.
4. The judgment of the Court of Justice
In its judgment, the Court examined the questions referred under two
subheadings, respectively pertaining to the notion of “not prohibitively
expensive” and the relevant criteria for assessing that requirement.
With respect to the first issue, the Court started by emphasizing thatArticle
3(8) Aarhus Convention states that the powers of national courts to award
reasonable costs in judicial proceedings are not to be affected.As EU law must
be “properly aligned” with the Convention, the requirement under Article
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10(a) EIA Directive and Article 15(a) IPPC Directive that judicial
proceedings should not be prohibitively expensive does not prevent the
national courts from making an order for costs.
The Court next pointed out that this requirement concerns all the costs
arising from participation in judicial proceedings, and must therefore be
assessed as a whole, taking into account all the costs borne by the party
concerned. Furthermore, the Court agreed with the Advocate General that an
autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Union was required.
Again in agreement with the Advocate General, the Court referred to the
objective of the EU legislature to give the public concerned “wide access to
justice”, as evidenced by the third paragraph of Article 10(a) EIA Directive
and the third paragraph of Article 15(a) IPPC Directive. It connected that
objective, first, to the desire of the Union legislature to preserve, protect and
improve the quality of the environment and to ensure that, to that end, the
public plays an active role and, second, to the observance of the right to an
effective remedy enshrined inArticle 47 of the Charter, and to the principle of
effectiveness, referring in that regard, as the Advocate General had done, to
Lesoochranárske zoskupenie: I (LZI).11 The Court further referred to the
UNECE’s The Aarhus Convention: An implementation guide,12 which
provides that the cost of bringing a challenge under the Convention or to
enforce national environmental law must not be so expensive as to prevent the
public from seeking review in appropriate cases.
The Court concluded that the requirement that judicial proceedings should
not be prohibitively expensive means that the persons covered by those
provisions should not be prevented from seeking or pursuing a claim for a
review by the courts that falls within the scope of those articles by reason of
the financial burden that might arise as a result. Where a national court is
called upon to make an order for costs against a member of the public who is
an unsuccessful claimant in an environmental dispute or, more generally,
where it is required (as courts in the UKmay be) to state its views, at an earlier
stage of the proceedings, on a possible capping of the costs for which the
unsuccessful partymay be liable, it must satisfy itself that that requirement has
been complied with, taking into account both the interest of the person
wishing to defend his rights and the public interest in the protection of the
environment.
With respect to the second issue, the Court pointed out that, as EU law does
not provide any precise guidance with respect to the notion of “prohibitively
expensive” proceedings, account must be taken of all the relevant provisions
of national law and, in particular, of any national legal aid scheme as well as of
11. Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, EU:C:2011:125.
12. Cited supra note 2, albeit to the first (and at the moment of the judgment only) edition.
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any costs protection regime as regards the methods likely to secure the
objective of ensuring effective judicial protectionwithout excessive cost in the
field of environmental law. Furthermore, as both the interest of the person
wishing to defend his rights and the public interest in the protection of the
environment must be taken into account, the relevant assessment by the
national court cannot be carried out solely on the basis of the financial
situation of the person concerned, but must also be based on an objective
analysis of the amount of the costs. Thus, the cost of proceedings must neither
exceed the financial resources of the person concerned nor appear to be
objectively unreasonable.
More in particular, as regards the analysis of the financial situation of the
person concerned, the national court’s assessment cannot be based exclusively
on the estimated financial resources of an “average” applicant. Other elements
that the national court may take into account include the situation of the
parties concerned, whether the claimant has a reasonable prospect of success,
the importance of what is at stake for the claimant, and for the protection of
the environment, the complexity of the relevant law and procedure and the
potentially frivolous nature of the claim at its various stages. In that regard, the
fact that the claimant has not been deterred, in practice, from asserting his or
her claim is not in itself sufficient to establish that the proceedings are not
prohibitively expensive.
Finally, the Court held that the requirement that judicial proceedings should
not be prohibitively expensive cannot be assessed differently by a national
court depending on whether it is adjudicating at the conclusion of
first-instance proceedings, an appeal or a second appeal.
5. Comments
This section considers two main issues. First, the consequences of the Court’s
ruling for cost rules within theMember States are examined. In particular, it is
argued that the principles laid down by the Court are applicable beyond
Aarhus Convention cases, and the difficulties that come with the Court’s
approach are illustrated by reference to the recent changes to cost rules in
relation to Aarhus Convention claims adopted by the UK. Second, the
increasing role of the ECJ as an international law court is explored. In that
regard, this section provides illustrations of how the EU’s enforcement
mechanisms also function as enforcement mechanisms of international law
within the Union. Finally, the question whether the Court is an accessible
international law court is considered.
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5.1. The EU shaping the Member States’ legal costs systems
5.1.1. Costs rules principles: Proportionality and predictability
In Edwards, the Court for the first time provided detailed guidance on EU law
requirements regarding Member State costs rules. In order for costs not to be
prohibitively expensive for the purposes of theAarhus Convention, they must
not be so expensive as to prevent members of the public from seeking review
in appropriate cases. For that purpose, a judge must take into account both the
interest of the person wishing to defend his rights and the public interest in the
protection of the environment. Costs may neither be subjectively nor
objectively unreasonable. As to their subjective unreasonableness, the judge
may take the financial situation of the applicant into account without basing
that assessment solely on the financial resources of an average applicant,13 as
well as other factors relating to the situation of the applicant, not specified in
the judgment.14 One could think, for example, of an applicant’s personal or
professional situation. Moreover, the fact that the applicant has not been
deterred from bringing proceedings is not in itself sufficient to establish that
the proceedings were not prohibitively expensive in regard of the applicant.15
As to their objective unreasonableness, the Court may take into account
whether the claimant has a reasonable prospect of success, the importance of
what is at stake for the claimant, and or the protection of the environment, the
complexity of the relevant law and procedure and the potentially frivolous
nature of the claim at its various stages.16 When making that assessment the
national court should have regard to all costs arising from participation in
judicial proceedings, not only the costs directly connected with the case
pending before it. 17 Furthermore, account must be taken of any legal aid
scheme as well as cost protection rules.18 Lastly, the requirement that
proceedings are not prohibitively expensive cannot be assessed differently
depending on the instance in which the national court is adjudicating.19
What emerges from both these subjective and objective factors is the strong
focus on the reasonableness and proportionality of costs, obliging a court to
take the particular circumstances of the applicant and the case into account
when determining whether costs are prohibitively expensive. This means that
national cost rules must leave a national court ample discretion to assess the
proportionality of costs, both in respect of the applicant and in regard of the
13. Judgment, para 41.
14. Ibid., para 42.
15. Ibid., para 43.
16. Ibid., para 42.
17. Ibid., paras. 27–28.
18. Ibid., para 38.
19. Ibid., para 45.
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proceedings. It probably precludes any cost rules system with stringent cost
allocation rules, applying fixed tariffs without a possibility to deviate from
them.
As mentioned above, that approach was subsequently confirmed in
Commission v. UK.20 The principle of proportionality of costs was, however,
complemented with a principle of predictability, the Court holding that
reasonable predictability as regards both cost allocation and the amount of
fees contributes to compliance with the requirement that judicial proceedings
should not be prohibitively expensive.21 This implies that the national court’s
discretion in assessing the proportionality of costs should somehow be
limited. Member States should therefore seek a middle ground between
predetermined tariffs and court discretion. In that respect, it appears that the
importance of the principle of predictability increases with the cost of judicial
proceedings.22 The more expensive judicial proceedings are, the higher the
predictability of costs and cost allocation should be.
5.1.2. Application beyond Aarhus Convention cases
The principles of proportionality and predictability were set out by the Court
in the context of judicial review proceedings falling within the scope of the
Aarhus Convention. It may be tempting to limit their effect to such
proceedings, as the United Kingdom did when it redesigned its cost rules for
judicial review proceedings falling within the scope of the Aarhus
Convention.23There are, however, reasons to believe that the principles set out
by the Court in Edwards and inCommission v.UK are the specific application
in the context of the Aarhus Convention of a number of principles that have
been developed by the Court in other areas of law. In that regard, Edwards and
Commission v. UK may be part of a blueprint for any cost rules in terms of
compliance with EU law, regardless of the area of law in which they are being
applied.
20. Case C-530/11, Commission v. UK.
21. Ibid., para 54. See alreadyCaseC-427/07,Commission v. Ireland, EU:C:2009:457, para
94. However, in that case, the ECJ focused on the precise and clear implementation of the EIA
and IPPC Directives, and did not state that predictability of costs was an element of the
requirement that proceedings should not be prohibitively expensive. See also Lenaerts, Maselis
and Gutman (Nowak Ed.), EU Procedural Law (OUP, 2014), pp. 169–170.
22. Case C-530/11, Commission v. UK, para 58.
23. See however The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government v. Venn
[2014] EWCA Civ 1539 (27 Nov. 2014), point 34. See further Pedersen, “The price is right:
Aarhus and access to justice”, 33Civil Justice Quarterly (2014), 15–16, suggesting that the fact
that the cost cap only applies to judicial review cases, thereby excluding significant areas of
statutory appeals and environmental claims in nuisance and negligence law, may potentially fall
foul of Art. 9(3) Aarhus Convention. See infra section 5.1.3.
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First, the principle of predictability can already be found in AMOK Verlags.
There, the Court held that a lawyer established in a Member State but offering
his services in another Member State must be subject to the cost rules of the
latter Member State, even if this would mean that reimbursement of lawyers’
fees by an unsuccessful party in a dispute to the successful party would be
limited. This would be in line with the objectives of Council Directive
77/249/EEC of 22March 1977 to facilitate the effective exercise by lawyers of
freedom to provide services24 and the only way to comply with the principle
of predictability, “and thus of legal certainty”,25 for a party as to the
application of the cost rules in the event of being unsuccessful. The principle
of predictability appears thus to be a specific emanation of the principle of
legal certainty, which is a general principle of EU law,26 and therefore
applicable outside the context of Aarhus Convention claims.
Second, the principle that costs should be proportionate appears in the
Court’s case law in various forms. For example, the requirement that a global
assessment of costs should be made, encompassing the various stages of
proceedings, is characteristic of the Court’s generous approach towards the
definition of costs. On that basis, it held that costs paid for legal representation
for the purposes of the presentation of an initial request for a payment order,
should be considered recoverable costs for the purposes of Article 3(1) of
Directive 2000/35 on late payments.27 Costs associated with exequatur
proceedings in accordance with Regulation 44/2001 were also deemed to be
recoverable costs within the scope of Article 14 of the IP Enforcement
Directive.28 The same applies to legal costs in the context of an action for
damages to compensate for the injury caused as a result of a seizure carried out
in another Member State with the aim of preventing an infringement of an
intellectual property right, when a question arises about a decision – given in
that other Member State – that the seizure was unjustified.29 Given the
24. Council Directive 77/249/EEC of 22 March 1977 to facilitate the effective exercise by
lawyers of freedom to provide services, O.J. 1977, L 78/17.
25. Case C-289/02, AMOK Verlags, EU:C:2003:669, para 30.
26. See e.g. Case C-427/14, SIA Veloserviss, EU:C:2015:803, para 30 and the case law cited
therein; further see Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2007), Ch. 6.
27. Directive 2000/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2000
on combating late payment in commercial transactions, O.J. 2000, L 200/35; Case C-235/03,
QDQ Media, EU:C:2005:147, para 17. However, since the case before the national court
concerned a dispute between private parties, and Spanish law could not be interpreted in
conformity with the Directive, the Directive could not itself offer a basis for the inclusion of
expenses of representation in the recoverable costs.
28. Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004
on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, O.J. 2004, L 157/45. See Case C-406/09,
Realchemie Nederland, EU:C:2011:668, para 49.
29. Case C-681/13, Diageo Brands, EU:C:2015:471, para 76.
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specific aim of the IP Enforcement Directive, namely preventing injured
parties from being deterred from bringing legal proceedings in order to protect
their IP rights, the Court deemed such a wide approach justified.30 This is an
aspect of the objective reasonableness of costs, since the Court deems their
recoverability necessary in the light of the nature of the proceedings, without
taking into account the specific situation of the applicant.Another example of
this in the case law is the fact that costs for legal representation cannot be
excluded from the amount of recoverable costs if legal representation is either
mandatory31 or necessary.32 Conversely, this means that unnecessary costs
should be excluded from the costs that a successful applicant can recover, as
they would probably not be objectively reasonable in the light of the dispute.
The Court has made this connection between legal representation and costs
on various occasions, either explicitly or implicitly. In Case C-63/01, Evans,
the Court ruled that Article 1(4) of Directive 84/5 on car insurance33 implied
that costs incurred by victims in connection with the processing of their
application for compensation are not included in the compensation awarded
for damage or injury caused by an unidentified or insufficiently insured
vehicle to be paid out by the body authorized under national law.34 Yet, if it
appeared that such reimbursement was necessary in order to safeguard their
rights, refusal of reimbursement would be problematic from the point of view
of the principle of effectiveness.35The fact that legal assistance is necessary in
such proceedings is a factor to be taken into account in respect of the less
advantageous position in which victims find themselves.36
This brings us to the question of legal aid. Indeed, where legal
representation is mandatory or necessary, the question of costs implies the
question whether legal aid is available. In that regard, both the nature of the
proceedings and the (financial) situation of the applicant should be taken into
account. This appears for example from Agrokonsulting, where the Court
found that the significant distance between the applicant’s place of residence
and the location of the court house was not per se problematic from the point
of view of the principle of effectiveness, since an individual in a position such
as that of the applicant was not obliged to appear in person but could be
30. Case C-406/09, Realchemie Nederland, paras. 48–49.
31. Case C-289/02, AMOK Verlags, para 39.
32. Case C-63/01, Evans, EU:C:2003:650, para 77.
33. Directive 84/5/EEC of 30 Dec. 1983 on the approximation of the laws of the Member
States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, O.J.
1984, L 8/17.
34. Case C-63/01, Evans, para 78.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., para. 77.
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represented, and because legal aid was available.37 Conversely, in the context
of asylum and immigration law, the Court held that legal assistance during the
hearing prior to the adoption of a return decision was not necessary, and that a
Member State is therefore not obliged to bear the costs of such legal assistance
by way of free legal aid.38
A specific question in this regard is the right to legal aid of legal persons.39
The Court has underlined in various cases the right of a company to legal
representation – or legal assistance – in the context of competition law
proceedings.40 The right to legal representation must, however, include a right
to legal aid when necessary, as otherwise the right to legal representation
cannot be exercised in a meaningful way. The question of the right to legal aid
of companies – or more precisely legal persons – was before the Court in
DEB.41 There, it held that legal aid cannot in principle be excluded under
Article 47 Charter.42 The requirements a national court should take into
account in order to determine a legal person’s eligibility for legal aid are very
similar to the criteria laid down in Edwards for the purposes of assessing
whether judicial proceedings are prohibitively expensive.
Thus, the Court held in DEB that it is as such not prohibited that the
conditions attached to the eligibility for legal aid may impact on access to
justice, provided that the core of the right to access to justice is not impaired
and that the limitation is proportionate.43 This is very similar to the idea in
Edwards that national courts have the power to award reasonable costs.44
Furthermore, when assessing the conditions attached to legal aid, courts may
take into account “the subject-matter of the litigation; whether the applicant
has a reasonable prospect of success; the importance of what is at stake for the
applicant in the proceedings; the complexity of the applicable law and
procedure; and the applicant’s capacity to represent himself effectively”.45
These same criteria can be found in Edwards in relation to the assessment of
the objective reasonableness of legal costs,46 which also focuses on the case as
such.There is also a clear similarity in relation to subjective factors to be taken
into account. Next to the applicable rules, the grant of legal aid to legal persons
37. Case C-93/12, Agrokonsulting, EU:C:2013:432, para 50.
38. Case C-249/13, Boudjlida, EU:C:2014:2431, para 71.
39. See the partial overview of the practices of the Member States in that regard in the
Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi in Case C-279/09, DEB, EU:C:2010:489, paras. 76–80.
40. See e.g. Joined Cases C-46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst, EU:C:1989:337, para 16.
41. Case C-279/09, DEB, EU:C:2010:811.
42. Ibid., para 52.
43. Ibid., para 60.
44. Judgment, para 26.
45. Case C-279/09, DEB, para 61.
46. Judgment, para 42.
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must be assessed in the light of their situation.47 The subject-matter of the
litigation may also be taken into consideration, in particular its economic
importance.48 For the purposes of taking account of the financial capacity of
a legal person applicant, consideration may be given inter alia to the form of
the company (whether it is a capital company or a partnership, whether it is a
limited liability company or otherwise); the financial capacity of its
shareholders; the objectives of the company; the manner in which it has been
set up; and, more specifically, the relationship between the resources allocated
to it and the intended activity.49
While specifically tailored in DEB to legal persons and for the purposes of
legal aid, the equivalent requirements appear in Edwards in relation to costs,
namely that both the financial situation and other factors connected with the
situation of the applicant can be taken into account.50 Another point of
Edwards, namely that all costs associated with judicial proceedings must be
taken into account,51 was also reflected in DEB, namely that a court should
take into account for the purposes of legal aid “the amount of the costs of the
proceedings in respect of which advance payment must be made and whether
or not those costs might represent an insurmountable obstacle to access to the
courts”.52 A final similarity concerns the interest of society in the outcome of
the proceedings. In that regard, the Court held in DEB that legal aid may not
depend on the public interest of society in the case but must be assessed on the
basis of the right of the person whose rights under EU law are violated.
The interest of society can, however, be taken into account as an element of the
proportionality assessment.53 That balance can also be found in Edwards, the
Court explicitly ruling out the possibility of taking solely the public interest
into account.54
That said, asAdvocate General Kokott rightly pointed out in her Opinion in
Edwards, legal protection under the Aarhus Convention goes further than
effective legal protection under Article 47 Charter, which expressly relates to
the protection of individual rights. In DEB and similar cases, the basis for the
assessment of the need to grant aid for effective legal protection is therefore
the actual person whose rights and freedoms as guaranteed by EU law have
been violated, rather than the public interest of society, even if that interest
may be one of the criteria for assessing the need for the aid. By contrast, legal
47. Case C-279/09, DEB, para 52.
48. Ibid., para 53.
49. Ibid., para 54.
50. Judgment, paras. 41–42.
51. Judgment, para 27. See already in that sense the Opinion of A.G. Kokott in Case
C-427/07, Commission v. Ireland, EU:C:2009:9, para 93.
52. Case C-279/09, DEB, para 54.
53. Ibid., para 42.
54. Judgment, para 39.
Case C-260/11 1739
protection in environmental matters “generally serves not only the individual
interests of claimants, but also, or even exclusively, the public”.55
It appears from all the above that the Court’s case law on legal costs and
legal aid runs largely in parallel. This is due to the fact that the ability to take
part in legal proceedings, especially when represented, is a question of
financial means, and thus appropriate support must be available. Since legal
aid is a means to cover legal costs, it seems logical that granting legal aid
depends largely on the same factors as the factors taken into account in order
to assess the reasonableness of legal costs.
The above arguably shows that the factors listed in Edwards and
Commission v.UK are particular instances of principles that apply throughout
the case law of the Court in areas not confined to the Aarhus Convention.
While the parameters set out by the Court in Edwards and Commission v. UK
were developed against the background of an explicit requirement in the
applicable EU legislative framework that the legal proceedings were not to be
“prohibitively expensive”,56 the underlying principles were used by the Court
beforeEdwards,57 and could be used in the future to assess bothMember State
cost rules and legal aid rules, as well as rules pertaining to court fees, either in
the context of the implementation of EU legal instruments or, in the absence of
such rules, within the national procedural autonomy framework.58 Member
States seeking to reform rules on costs, legal aid, or court fees should therefore
take a close look at the Court’s case law in this area.
5.1.3. The tension between predictability and proportionality in the new
UK cost rules in relation to Aarhus Convention judicial review
claims
Already during the proceedings in Edwards, the UK reformed its costs rules
for judicial review proceedings falling in the scope of theAarhus Convention.
The reform was both the result of an internal review on legal costs and a
reaction to the pending infringement proceedings in Commission v. UK. A
consultation on “Cost Protection for Litigants in Environmental Judicial
55. Opinion, paras. 39–40. Compare with the Opinion of A.G. Kokott in Case C-243/15,
Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK: (LZ II), EU:C:2016:491, para 99, referring to Art. 9(4)
Aarhus Convention as a “specific expression” of Art. 47 Charter.
56. As pointed out by A.G. Jääskinen in his Opinion in Case C-61/14, Orizzonte Salute,
EU:C:2015:307, para 23, footnote 13.
57. See e.g. Case C-472/99, Clean Car Autoservice, EU:C:2001:663, para 32; Case
C-215/11, Szyrocka, EU:C:2012:794, paras. 34–35.
58. See e.g. Case C-61/14, Orizzonte Salute, EU:C:2015:655, paras. 56–58 and 77,
adopting a similar proportionality and reasonableness assessment, though without referring to
Edwards, presumably because of the rather specific context, i.e. judicial proceedings relating to
the award of public contracts in Italy governed by EU public procurement law.
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Review Claims” was launched,59 which led to the amendment of the Civil
Procedure Rules (CPR),60 and the corresponding Practice Direction.61 The
changes entered into force on 1April 2013 and applied to cases brought after
June 2013.
Individual applicants will henceforth be maximally liable for £5,000 and
legal persons for £10,000. The caps cannot be altered or contested when
granted. This raises two problems. First, it will depend on the specific case
whether the costs for which a claimant is liable are reasonable.Would a small
NGO now feel comfortable going to court knowing that it may potentially be
liable to pay £10,000 when losing the case?62Moreover, a potential liability of
£5,000 would still deter people earning below £15,000 per year from going to
court.63 Second, can a system of fixed costs be compatible at all with the
principle of reasonableness, given the fact that reasonableness inherently
entails an element of assessment, which is excluded under such a system?64
There is now a total absence of discretion, in the sense that judges are not
allowed to take objective or subjective factors into account. That being said,
the result is total predictability as to the maximum amount of costs, which
remedies the major deficiency in the previous cost allocation system, for
which the UK was found to be in breach of its EU law obligations in
Commission v. UK.
Matters are, however, less predictable when entering the appeal stage. As
the Court stated in Edwards, the assessment of whether judicial proceedings
are prohibitively expensive should not differ depending on whether a judge is
adjudicating at first instance or on appeal.65 For appeals in fixed cost cases, the
applicable cost rule gives considerable discretion to the appeal judge to take
into account the means of both parties, all the circumstances of the case, and
the need to facilitate access to justice.66 This method of assessment differs
manifestly from that applicable to first-instance proceedings: no assessment
59. Ministry of Justice, Cost Protection for Litigants in Environmental Judicial Review
Claims – Outline Proposals for a Cost Capping Scheme for Cases which Fall within theAarhus
Convention, Consultation Paper CP16/11, 19 Oct. 2011, available at <www.consult.justice.gov.
uk/digital-communications/cost_protection_litigants>.
60. SectionVII in Part 45 CPR on “Costs limits inAarhus Convention claims” was inserted
in the CPR.
61. Practice Direction 45.43.
62. Ministry of Justice, Cost Protection for Litigants in Environmental Judicial Review
Claims – Outline Proposals for a Cost Capping Scheme for Cases which Fall within theAarhus
Convention, Response to Consultation CP(R) 16/11, p. 10.
63. Ibid., pp. 10 and 19, conclusion No. 3.
64. Judgment, para 35; See, however, the corresponding Scottish rules, which provide that
a court may lower the sum of the £5,000 cap on cause shown by the applicant: Rule 58A–4(2)
Court of Session Rules.
65. Ibid., paras. 44–45.
66. Rule 52.19 CPR.
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and a fixed costs cap. This does not protect claimants from being presented
with unpredictably high legal costs at the appeal stage. However, it does allow
the appeal judge to take costs incurred at earlier levels into account, which is
in line with the requirement that all costs associated with judicial proceedings
should be taken into account.67
In sum, the replacement of court-made rules with a strict rule-based
instrument providing for fixed costs seems to have addressed a main concern
regarding costs in judicial review proceedings relating to environmental
matters, namely unpredictability. Yet, it appears that the UK may have
overshot its target, opting for a large amount of predictability without the
possibility for judges to take specific circumstances into account. That may
possibly have been a reaction to the reasoned opinion of the Commission in the
infringement proceedings in Commission v. UK, where the focus was indeed
on predictability and the effective implementation of Union law. However,
Edwards has shown that there should be room for a specific assessment,
taking into account both the personal situation of a claimant and the context of
the proceedings. The issue was eventually taken up in the 2015 Consultation
regarding Costs Protection in Environmental Claims, which may lead to
further amendments of Part 45 CPR.
5.2. The ECJ as an international (environmental) law court
5.2.1. EU enforcement of international law
Whatever themerits of the Court’s decision inEdwards or the usefulness of its
guidance to the national courts, it is clear that EU law in general and the ECJ
in particular acts as a crucial enforcement mechanism for the Aarhus
Convention. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that the Court’s normal
jurisdiction applies to treaties concluded by the EU, as regards their
interpretation and the validity of the decisions to conclude them on the EU’s
behalf.68 Article 216(2) TFEU provides for agreements concluded by the
Union to be “binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member
States”. Such agreements prevail over EU secondary law,69 and their
provisions form an integral part of the EU legal order as from their entry into
force.70 The direct consequence thereof is that the validity of an EU actmay be
affected by the fact that it is incompatible with rules of international law when
67. Judgment, para 27.
68. See e.g. Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others (ATAA),
EU:C:2011:864, on which see De Baere and Ryngaert, “The ECJ’s judgment in Air Transport
Association ofAmerica and the international legal context of the EU’s climate change policy”,
18 EFA Rev. (2013), 389–410.
69. Case C-366/10, ATAA, para 50.
70. Case C-181/73,Haegeman, EU:C:1974:41, para 5; and Case C-366/10, ATAA, para 73.
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a number of (rather stringent) conditions are fulfilled.71 While the Court has
not yet invalidated an EU act in the light of the Aarhus Convention either
through a reference for a preliminary ruling on the validity of an EU act or
through a direct action,72 it has interpreted and applied the Convention either
directly or through the EU implementing legislation in a growing number of
cases,73 thereby enhancing the enforcement of the Convention in the Member
States’ legal orders.
71. Case C-366/10, ATAA, paras. 52–55: First, the EUmust be bound by those rules (Joined
Cases C-21-24/72, International Fruit Company and Others, EU:C:1972:115, para 7); second,
the nature and the broad logic of the Treaty in question must not preclude the ECJ from
examining the validity of an EU act in the light of its provisions (Joined Cases C-120 & 121/06
P, FIAMM et al. v. Council and Commission, EU:C:2008:476, para 110); third, the Treaty
provisions relied upon for the purpose of examining the validity of the EU act in question
appear, as regards their content, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise (Case C-344/04,
IATA and ELFAA, EU:C:2006:10, para 39), i.e. they contain a clear and precise obligation that
is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure (Case
C-12/86, Demirel, EU:C:1987:400, para 14).
72. For a recent example of an unsuccessful action for annulment of an act of secondary EU
legislation on the basis of theAarhus Convention, see Joined Cases C-401-403/12 P, Council v.
Vereniging Milieudefensie and Others, EU:C:2015:4, paras. 54–55; and Joined Cases C-404 &
405/12 P, Council and Commission v. Stichting Natuur en Milieu and PesticideAction Network
Europe, EU:C:2015:5, in which the ECJ held that Art. 9(3)Aarhus Convention does not contain
an unconditional and sufficiently precise obligation capable of directly regulating the legal
position of individuals, and so does not meet the conditions for provisions of an international
agreement to which the EU is a party to be relied on in support of an action for annulment of an
act of secondary EU law. For a comment, see Gáspár-Szilágyi, “The relationship between EU
law and international agreements: Restricting the application of the Fediol and Nakajima
exceptions in Vereniging Milieudefensie” 52 CML Rev. (2015), 1059–1077. Building on the
judgment in Vereniging Milieudefensie, the Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Case C-543/14,
Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone and Others, EU:C:2016:157, para 92,
argues that, as the procedures referred to in Art. 9(1) to (3) Aarhus Convention each refer to
criteria of national law, and given that the Court has held, on that ground, thatArt. 9(3) does not
contain an unconditional and sufficiently precise obligation capable of regulating the legal
position of individuals directly and is subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption
of a subsequent measure,Art. 9(4)Aarhus Convention, which relates to the procedures referred
to in Art. 9(1) to (3), “cannot be relied upon to call into question the validity of a provision of
Union legislation”. Relying on that point of A.G. Sharpston’s Opinion, the Court held that Art.
9(4) Aarhus Convention “cannot be relied on to challenge the validity of Directive 2006/112”:
Case C-543/14,Ordre des barreaux francophoues et germanophone andOthers, EU:2016:605,
para 54 (it held that the same was true regarding Art. 9(5) Aarhus Convention: Ibid., paras.
55–56. Contrast with the Opinion of A.G. Kokott in C-243/15, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie,
paras. 61–62, taking the view that “it is clear from Art. 1 of the Aarhus Convention that that
Convention is, by virtue of its nature and purpose, intended to create rights for individuals and
associations in the field of environmental protection”, and that “the Court has already held that
Art. 11 of the EIA Directive is directly applicable in relation to the rights of environmental
associations. The same must also be true of Art. 9(2) of the Convention, since that provision is
the same in all significant respects as Art. 11 of the EIA Directive”.
73. See, most recently, Case C-243/15, LZ II.
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The issue raised in Edwards is a good example in that regard. The UK had
been the object of a number of decisions issued by the Aarhus Convention
Compliance Committee (ACCC), a body set up by the Parties to the Aarhus
Convention to monitor their compliance with the Convention, concerning
prohibitively expensive costs in the context of judicial review proceedings on
matters within the scope of theAarhus Convention.74 The ACCC can provide
advice and facilitate assistance regarding implementation to individual Parties
in consultation with the Party concerned or even, subject to agreement with
the Party concerned, make recommendations, request the submission of a
compliance strategy or make recommendations on measures to address a
matter raised by a member of the public.75 Its decisions, while having de facto
normative weight, are, however, not legally binding.76 Furthermore, an ACCC
decision in relation to the UK may not be ofmuch practical use for those filing
a complaint with the ACCC, as theAarhus Convention is, within the UK, “not
directly applicable in domestic law”.77 The lack of enforceability of the
74. UNECE, Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making andAccess to Justice in EnvironmentalMatters, Report of the
Compliance Committee on its Twenty-Ninth meeting, Addendum, Findings and
recommendations with regard to communication ACCC/C/2008/27 concerning compliance by
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Adopted by the Compliance
Committee on 24 Sept. 2010, UN Doc. ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2010/6/Add.2, 9–10, paras. 49–53;
UNECE, Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making andAccess to Justice in EnvironmentalMatters, Report of the
Compliance Committee on its Twenty-Ninth meeting, Addendum, Findings and
recommendations with regard to communication ACCC/C/2008/33 concerning compliance by
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Adpoted by the Compliance
Committee on 24 Sept. 2010, UNDoc. ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2010/6/Add.3, 32–33, paras. 141–145.
75. UNECE, Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making andAccess to Justice in EnvironmentalMatters, Report of the
First Meeting of the Parties, Addendum, Decision I/7, Review of Compliance, adpoted at the
first meeting of the Parties held in Lucca, Italy, on 21–23 Oct. 2002, UN Doc.
ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.8.
76. Cf. the Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Case C-204/09, Flachglas Torgau,
EU:C:2011:413, para 58, referring with approval to the submissions of the German
Government and the Commission that the implementation guide “has no authoritative status as
regards the interpretation of the Convention”.
77. R. (on the application of Edwards and another (Appellant)) v. Environmental Agency
andOthers (Respondents) (No. 2) [2013]UKSC78, para 1. However, see Walton v.The Scottish
Ministers (Scotland) (Rev. 1) [2012] UKSC 44, para 100: “The decisions of the Committee
deserve respect on issues relating to standards of public participation.” And see UNECE,
Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Compliance Committee,
Forty-eighth meeting, Findings and recommendations with regard to communication
ACCC/C/2012/77 concerning compliance by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, Adopted by the Compliance Committee on 2 July 2014, UN Doc.
ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2015/3, 13, para 79: “The Committee takes this opportunity to point out that
the Party concerned, being a Party to the Convention, is bound by the Convention under
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Aarhus compliance mechanism can be contrasted with the enforcement
mechanisms under EU law. Through the preliminary ruling procedure, the
ECJ has given binding guidance as to how the criterion of prohibitively
expensive costs should be assessed. Contrary to ACCC decisions, preliminary
rulings are binding on Member State courts, and provide a benchmark on the
basis of which to evaluate their national cost rules. Moreover, it was in
reaction to the Commission’s reasoned opinion in the infringement
proceedings in Commission v. UK that the UK changed its rules on costs in
relation to matters covered by the Aarhus Convention.78 A reasoned opinion
by the Commission, while not binding on the Member State,79 appeared to be
enough to induce the UK to adapt its legislation, which is of course precisely
the goal of the pre-litigation procedure underArticle 258 TFEU.80 This is but
one illustration of how Union law and its enforcement mechanisms can make
the application of international environmental law more effective in the
Member States. Two further examples can help to illustrate that point.
First, in Bund für Umwelt,81 an NGO brought proceedings against a
decision relating to the construction and operation of a coal-fired power
station near a special area of conservation within the meaning of the Habitats
Directive.82 Under German administrative law, parties can in principle only
bring judicial proceedings against administrative measures in case of
impairment of a rule protecting individual rights (so-called
Individualrechtsschutz).83 Since the rules allegedly breached only concerned
international law and that the nature of its nations legal system or lack of incorporation of the
Convention in national law are not arguments that it can successfully avail itself of as
justification for improper implementation of the Convention.”
78. Hurst, “The new costs rules and practice directions”, 32 Civil Justice Quarterly (2013),
153–166, at 158. However, it should be pointed out that problems relating to costs in the context
of the Aarhus Convention had already been signalled by UK judges before the Commission
initiated infringement proceedings.
79. Case C-48/65, Lütticke v. Commission, EU:C:1966:8.
80. Lenaerts et al., op. cit. supra note 21, p. 186.
81. Case C-115/09, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, EU:C:2011:289.
82. Council Directive 92/43/EC of 21May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and
of wild fauna and flora, O.J. 1992, L206/7, as amended by Directive 2006/105/EC of 20 Nov.
2006, O.J. 2006, L363/368.
83. Note that limited litigation rights for environmental protection associations in matters
of nature conservation already existed at the level of the Länder and the Federation at the time;
see Wörlen, “Compatibility of the German administrative litigation system with international
and European environmental law”, in Holtwisch, Fajardo del Castillo and Tichá (Eds.),
Strengthening European Environmental Law in an Enlarged Union (Shaker Verlag, 2004),
p. 124. With the enactment of the 2005 Umwelt-Rechtsbehelfsgesetz, further litigation rights
were given to recognized environmental protection organizations in a number of other limited
areas, inter alia decisions relating to the EIA Directive. The main problem was the condition
that they must act on the basis of a rule conferring rights upon individuals, which limited the
action possibilities of environmental protection associations to act truly on behalf of the
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the general public and not the protection of individual rights, the Higher
Administrative Court for the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia considered that
the NGO could not bring proceedings.84 Nevertheless, it was not insensitive to
the NGO’s arguments that standing conditions under German administrative
law violated the right of access to justice under theAarhus Convention and EU
implementing legislation, and it referred a number of questions to the ECJ.85
In its judgment, the ECJ held thatArticle 10(a) EIA Directive (and henceArt.
9(2) Aarhus Convention) precluded national legislation excluding NGOs
promoting environmental protection from bringing court proceedings on the
ground that the infringement of the rule flowing from EU environmental law
only protects the interest of the general public and not the interest of
individuals, and that such NGOs could derive a right to court directly from the
Directive.86The judgment had an immediate impact in the German legal order
when the Bundesverwaltungsgericht quashed a judgment of the Higher
Administrative Court of Hesse87 on the grounds that it had violated Article
10(a) EIA Directive (and thus the Aarhus Convention) by declaring
inadmissible an action brought by an NGO on the ground that no individual
rights had been impaired.88 The Bundesverwaltungsgericht further stated that
the applicable German legislation should no longer be applied and that NGOs
could rely directly on Article 10(a) EIA Directive to bring judicial
proceedings as long as the necessary amendments had not been adopted.89The
HigherAdministrative Court for the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia reached
the same conclusion shortly afterwards.90 Eventually, the relevant German
legislation was amended.91
environment, in absence of any private interest in the matter; see Schlacke, “Das
umwelt-rechtsbehelfsgesetz”, Natur und Recht (2007), 8–16.
84. Oberverwaltungsgericht NRW, 8 D 58/08.AK.
85. Case C-115/09, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, para 50.
86. Ibid., paras. 50 and 59.
87. VGH Hessen, 16.09.2009 – 6 C 1005/08.T.
88. BVerwG 7 C 21.09 (2011), DE:BVerwG:2011:290911U7C21.09.0.
89. BVerwG 7 C 21.09 (2011), DE:BVerwG:2011:290911U7C21.09.0, para 28.
90. Oberverwaltungsgericht NRW, 8 D 58/08.AK (01/12/2011). See similarly Case
C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, and the subsequent proceedings before the Slovak
Supreme Court, in which the latter overturned its settled case law by ruling that environmental
protection associations should be granted the status of “party to the proceedings” so as to enable
them to challenge the legality of decisions negatively impacting on the environment: Najvyšší
súd Slovenskej republicky, No. 3 St¸p/49/2009, 2 Aug. 2011. The dialogue between the Slovak
Supreme Court and the ECJ on judicial protection under theAarhus Convention is continuing,
notably through a reference for a preliminary ruling in a second case, Case C-243/15, LZ II.
91. Gesetz vom 21.01.2013 zur Änderung des Umwelt-Rechtsbehelfsgesetzes und anderer
umweltrechtlicher Vorschriften, Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I 2013 Nr. 3 28.01.2013 S. 95. Yet
German legislation turned out to be still not entirely in compliance with EU law requirements:
Case C-137/14, Commission v. Germany, EU:C:2014:67. See also Minami, “The Aarhus
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Second, in Solvay,92 members of the public challenged before the Belgian
Constitutional Court aDecree of the Walloon Parliament “ratifying” a number
of planning and environmental permits. The Walloon Parliament had ratified
these permits by decree after annulment proceedings had been started against
the permits before the Belgian Council of State. By incorporating them in a
legislative act, the Walloon Parliament immunized the permits against judicial
review by the Council of State, which, as the supreme administrative court,
only has jurisdiction to review the legality of administrative acts and not of
legislative acts. The Decree was subsequently challenged before the
Constitutional Court on the ground that the legislative procedure leading to
the adoption of the Decree suffered from defects. The main problem was that
the Constitutional Court had no jurisdiction to verify the correctness of the
decision-making procedure for the adoption of a legislative act. Consequently,
it was not possible under Belgian law to have the legality of the Decree
reviewed on that ground. Upon a reference from the Constitutional Court,93
the ECJ ruled inter alia that Article 9(2) to (4) Aarhus Convention required
that the decision-making procedure leading up the a legislative act falling
within the scope of the Aarhus Convention must be amenable to review by a
court or an independent body.94 In its subsequent judgment, the Belgian
Constitutional Court concluded that, although it had no competence under
national law, it was obliged to review the decision-making process leading up
to the adoption of the Decree as a result of the ECJ’s judgment.95
Consequently, the Decree was annulled and proceedings before the Council of
State became pending again.96
These examples have in common that the national courts in question were
only prepared to give full effect to theAarhus Convention after an intervention
by the ECJ. This is remarkable, since these courts were also bound by the
Aarhus Convention through their national legal order and could have reached
Convention and cases of non-compliance with environmental impact assessment requirements:
The EU and Japan” in Nakanshi (Ed.), Contemporary Issues in Environmental Law: The EU
and Japan (Springer, 2016), pp. 54–56.
92. Case C-182/10, Solvay, EU:C:2012:82. See also Joined Cases C-128-131, 134 &
135/09, Boxus, EU:C:2011:667.
93. Belgian Constitutional Court, 30 March 2010, No. 30/2010.
94. Case C-182/10, Solvay, para 52. See also Joined Cases C-128-131, 134 & 135/09,
Boxus, para 57.
95. Belgian Constitutional Court, 22 Nov. 2012, No. 144/2012, B.13.
96. Ibid., B.14.1 and B 14.2. See further on the possible implications of the Boxus and
Solvay case law within UK constitutional law: R (HS2ActionAlliance Ltd) v Secretary of State
for Transport [2014] UKSC 3, on which see Craig, “Constitutionalizing constitutional law:
HS2”, (2014) Public Law, 373–392; and Elliott, “Constitutional legislation, European Union
law and the nature of the United Kingdom’s contemporary constitution”, 10 EuConst (2014),
379–392.
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the same conclusion without an intervention by the ECJ. The German courts,
for example, were well aware of the problem of restricted standing conditions
for NGOs long before the ECJ’s judgment in Bund für Umwelt, and the topic
had been the subject of debate in legal scholarship for decades.97 It thus seems
that Member State courts respond differently to rules of international law
when at the same time EU law obligations are involved.A core element in this
is the judicial architecture of the EU,98 with the ECJ playing the role of catalyst
through the preliminary ruling procedure. By attaching its authority and the
EU principles of primacy and effectiveness to theAarhus Convention, the ECJ
obliged the national courts to leave aside deeply entrenched rules of national
procedural law and to give full effect to EU law and hence to international law.
The effect of the intervention by the ECJ should not be underestimated: strong
supranational courts of regional integration organizations like the EU can play
an important role in the development and enforcement of international law. 99
5.2.2. The ECJ as an accessible (international law) court
The Aarhus Convention is only one example of how the Union legal order in
general and the ECJ in particular has functioned as a powerful catalyst for the
effect of international treaties in the national legal orders of the Member
States.100 For the Court to play that role, it is not even strictly necessary that the
Union should be a party to the international agreement in question:101 as soon
97. Schmid, Schrader and Zschiesche, Die Verbandsklage im Umwelt- und
Naturschutzrecht (Beck, 2014), pp. 1–4; Rizou, Zugang zu Gerichten im Umweltrecht (Peter
Lang, 2006), p. 149; Rebhinder, “Germany”, in Ebbesson (Ed.), Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters in the EU – Accès à la Justice en Matière d’Environnement dans l’UE
(Kluwer Law International, 2002), p. 248.
98. Cf. De Baere and Roes, “EU loyalty as good faith”, 64 ICLQ (2015), 841 and 845.
99. See also Nollkaemper, “The role of national courts in inducing compliance with
international and European law – A comparison”, in Cremona (Ed.), Compliance and the
Enforcement of EU Law (OUP, 2012), pp. 188–193.
100. See in that sense also Ziegler, “International law and EU law: Between asymmetric
constitutionalisation and fragmentation”, in Orakhelashvili (Ed.), Research Handbook on the
Theory and History of International Law (Edward Elgar, 2011), pp. 280–281, arguing that
through its special enforcement instruments, EU law reinforces international law substantively
and procedurally.
101. That is well illustrated by the Court’s case lawwith respect to the Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 UNTS 150 (the Geneva Convention). By generally
aligning its case law with the Geneva Convention, the Court has enabled the Member States to
align their judicial and administrative practices both to their international obligations under the
Geneva Convention and their obligations under EU law. In that way, the ECJ – esp. through the
preliminary ruling procedure – plays a critical role in providing within the EU the consistency
and unity in application and implementation that the Geneva Convention lacked in its original
set-up.That alignment of EU lawwith the Geneva Convention is confirmed byArt. 18, Charter,
and has now become part of settled case law: See Joined Cases C-175, 176, 178 & 179/08,
SalahadinAbdulla and Others, EU:C:2010:105, paras. 52–53, and most recently, Joined Cases
C-443 & 444/14, Alo, EU:C:2016:127, paras. 28–29. See further De Baere, “The Court of
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as EU law contains certain norms originating from international treaties, the
Court acts as the guarantor of uniform interpretation and enforcement within
the EU legal order.
Conversely, an interpretation of an international law concept by the ECJ
may also influence the development of international law outside the EU legal
order. Edwards could be an appropriate example in that regard. Now the ECJ
has given a binding interpretation on the rather abstract concept of
“prohibitively expensive costs” for (at least for the time being) 29 of the 47
parties to theAarhus Convention, courts from outside the EUmay well turn to
the ECJ’s judgment when seeking inspiration for an interpretation of that
notion.102
Nevertheless, in order to play its role of enforcer of international
(environmental) law, it is imperative that the ECJ itself is sufficiently
accessible, either indirectly, through references for a preliminary ruling such
as in Edwards, or directly. Such access requires addressing different types of
potential obstacles to access to justice, including costs, but also the stringent
locus standi conditions for direct actions, or the strict conditions for the review
of the legality of EU acts on the basis of international agreements such as the
Aarhus Convention.103 Like the role of costs, the latter two potential obstacles
can be illustrated by returning to the Aarhus Convention.
First, access to judicial protection in the Union has been the subject of a
number of cases before the ACCC. Given that the involvement of the public in
judicial proceedings with respect to environmental issues is one of the main
innovations of the Aarhus Convention, the locus standi requirements in
Article 263(4) TFEU (ex Art. 230(4) EC) are an understandable source of
concern for the ACCC. Notably, on 1 December 2008, ClientEarth submitted
a communication to the ACCC alleging that the EU had failed to comply with
its obligations under the Aarhus Convention, inter alia by applying the
“individual concern” standing criterion to actions for annulment under Article
263(4) TFEU brought by private individuals and NGOs, and by charging the
applicants before the EU Courts with expenses of an uncertain and possibly
prohibitive nature in the event of the loss of their case.104 In Part I of its
Luxembourg acting as an asylum court”, in Alen, Joosten, Leysen and Verrijdt (Eds.), Liberae
Cogitationes: Liber Amicorum Marc Bossuyt (Intersentia, 2013), pp. 107–124.
102. Indeed, themost recent edition of the Convention’s ImplementationGuide (cited supra
note 2) refers, next to ACCC decisions, to Case C-427/07, Commission v. Ireland, as having
established that “mere judicial discretion to decline to order the unsuccessful party to pay the
costs of the procedure cannot be regarded as valid implementation of the Convention’s
requirement that the procedure must not be ‘prohibitively expensive’”, p. 204.
103. See supra section 5.2.1.
104. UNECE,Meeting of the Parties to the [Aarhus Convention], Compliance Committee,
Thirty-second meeting, Report of the Compliance Committee Addendum Findings and
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findings, while the ACCC held the claims with respect to costs before the EU
courts not to be sufficiently substantiated,105 the ECJ’s case law with respect
to locus standi for non-privileged applicants came in for heavy criticism. In
particular, the ACCC held it to be “clear to the Committee thatArticle 230(4)
TEC, on which the ECJ has based its strict position on standing, is drafted in
a way that could be interpreted so as to provide standing for qualified
individuals and civil society organizations in a way that would meet the
standard of Article 9(3) of the Convention”.106 It also emphasized that while
the “system of judicial review in the national courts of EU Member States,
including the possibility to request a preliminary ruling, is a significant
element for ensuring consistent application and proper implementation of EU
law in its Member States, it cannot be a basis for generally denying members
of the public access to the EU Courts to challenge decisions, acts and
omissions by EU institutions and bodies”.107 Nevertheless, the ACCC held
that it was not convinced that the Union had failed to comply with theAarhus
Convention, given the evidence before it, but that it considered that a new
direction of the case law of the EU Courts should be established in order to
ensure compliance. In particular, the ACCC refrained from examining
whether the Aarhus Regulation or any other relevant internal administrative
review procedure of the EU met the requirements on access to justice in the
Convention, because it was waiting for the outcome of the Vereniging
Milieudefensie and Stichting Natuur en Milieu cases. In the Draft of Part II of
its findings, the ACCCmade it quite clear that neither the ECJ’s judgments in
those cases,108 nor its post-Lisbon case law on locus standi,109 were sufficient
to ensure compliance with the Convention, holding that the EU “fails to
comply with Article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Convention with regard to
access to justice by members of the public because neither the Aarhus
Regulation nor the jurisprudence of the ECJ implements or complies with the
obligations arising under those paragraphs”.110 The ACCC recommended
that “all relevant EU institutions within their competences take the steps
necessary to provide the public concerned with access to justice in
recommendations with regard to communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part I) concerning
compliance by the European Union, UN Doc. ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2011/4/Add.1, paras. 1–2.
105. Ibid., para 93.
106. Ibid., para 86.
107. Ibid., para 90.
108. Joined Cases C-401-403/12 P, Vereniging Milieudefensie; and Joined Cases C-404 &
405/12 P, Stichting Natuur.
109. See in particular Case C-456/13 P, T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v. Commission,
EU:C:2015:284.
110. UNECE, Draft Findings and Recommendations of the Compliance Committee with
regard to Communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part II) Concerning Compliance by the European
Union, para 115.
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environmental matters in accordance withArticle 9, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the
Convention”, and in particular that if the Union were to rely on ECJ case law
to correct the non-compliance, the ECJ “a) assesses the legality of the EU’s
implementing measures in the light of those obligations and acts accordingly;
and b) interprets EU law in a way which, to the fullest extent possible, is
consistent with the objectives laid down in Article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4”.111
Second, while Edwards and the other examples considered above arguably
demonstrate that the ECJ can act as an effective enforcer of international law
within the legal orders of the EUMember States, the Court’s rather restrictive
case law regarding the test to be satisfied for international agreements to be
used to review the validity of secondary EU acts112 and, specifically with
respect to the Aarhus Convention, the ECJ’s judgments in Vereniging
Milieudefensie and in Stichting Natuur en Milieu,113 tell an altogether
different story,114 and call for a nuanced assessment of the ECJ’s role as an
international (environmental) court.
6. Conclusion
The costs of judicial proceedings can have a clear chilling effect or constitute
an obstacle to access to environmental justice. As the report drafted on the
Commission’s request by Jan Darpö, chair of the Aarhus Convention Access
to Justice Task Force,115 shows, while the issues in that regard in the UK legal
system are or were arguably marked, they are in no way limited to that
Member State.116 Problems in various Member States include high court fees,
111. Ibid., paras. 116 and 118.
112. See the overview in Kuijper, Wouters, Hoffmeister, De Baere, and Ramopoulos, The
Law of EU External Relations: Cases, Materials, and Commentary on the EU as an
International Legal Actor, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2015), Ch. 12.
113. Joined Cases C-401-403/12 P, Vereniging Milieudefensie; and Joined Cases C-404 &
405/12 P, Stichting Natuur en Milieu
114. Cf. de Búrca, “Internalization of international law by the CJEU and the US Supreme
Court”, 13 I-Con (2015), 1004, arguing that the ECJ’s approach towards international law has
changed from exceptionally open in earlier days to considerably more cautious and conditional
more recently, “except in cases in which it is enforcing international law against Member
States”.
115. Darpö, Effective Justice? Synthesis report of the study on the Implementation of
Articles 9.3 and 9.4 of the Aarhus Convention in the Member States of the European Union,
(2013-10-11/Final).
116. e.g. Case C-543/14, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone and Others,
in which the Belgian Constitutional Court (No. 165/2014, 13 Nov. 2014) requested the ECJ
inter alia to assess the validity of Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 Nov. 2006 on the common
system of value added tax, O.J. L 347/1 in the light of, amongst others, theAarhus Convention,
to the extent that it makes lawyers subject to the system of VAT, leading to an increase in
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the loser pays principle in relation to cost liability, compulsory use of specific
categories of counsel in court, expenses for expert witnesses, high securities
for obtaining interim relief, and uncertainty as regards cost.117
As explored above, theAarhus Convention itself includes the obligation for
parties to ensure that the relevant national procedures should provide adequate
and effective remedies, including injunctive relief as appropriate, and be “fair,
equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive”,118 and to consider the
establishment of appropriate assistance mechanisms to remove or reduce
financial and other barriers to access to justice.119 As Edwards illustrates,
effective enforcement in the Member States’ legal orders of those obligations
has been significantly enhanced by EU law and by the ECJ in particular.
Finally, it must be borne in mind that the UK is a party to the Aarhus
Convention in its own right, and that a withdrawal from the EU pursuant to
Article 50 TEU would not affect the UK’s obligation under international law
to comply with the Convention, including the requirement under Article 9(4)
Aarhus Convention that procedures ensuring access to justice in
environmental matters “provide adequate and effective remedies, including
injunctive relief as appropriate, and be fair, equitable, timely and not
prohibitively expensive”. However, judicial protection under the Convention
would have to be provided solely by the UK courts, as appropriate against the
background of the non-binding guidance provided by the ACCC, but without
the ECJ’s role providing an EU-wide binding interpretation of the
Convention.
Geert De Baere and Janek Tomasz Nowak*
lawyers’ fees and therefore potentially affecting access to justice in environmental matters. The
Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in the case concluded that examination of the questions referred
disclosed nothing capable of affecting the validity of Directive 2006/112; see on the Aarhus
Convention esp. paras. 89–93. The Court agreed.
117. Darpö, op. cit. supra note 115, p. 38.
118. Art. 9(4) Aarhus Convention.
119. Art. 9(5) Aarhus Convention.
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